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The literature on the costs of climate change often draws a link between climatic ‘tipping points’ 
and large economic shocks, frequently called ‘catastrophes’. The phrase ‘tipping points’ in this 
context can be misleading. In popular and social scientific discourse, ‘tipping points’ involve 
abrupt state changes. For some climatic ‘tipping points,’ the commitment to a state change may 
occur abruptly, but the change itself may be rate-limited and take centuries or longer to realize. 
Additionally, the connection between climatic ‘tipping points’ and economic losses is tenuous, 
though emerging empirical and process-model-based tools provide pathways for investigating it. 
We propose terminology to clarify the distinction between ‘tipping points’ in the popular sense, 
the critical thresholds exhibited by climatic and social ‘tipping elements,’ and ‘economic 
shocks’. The last may be associated with tipping elements, gradual climate change, or non-
climatic triggers. We illustrate our proposed distinctions by surveying the literature on climatic 
tipping elements, climatically sensitive social tipping elements, and climate-economic shocks, 
and we propose a research agenda to advance the integrated assessment of all three. 
1 Introduction 
Whether labeled ‘tipping points’ [Lenton and Schellnhuber, 2007; Lenton et al., 2008], 
‘large-scale singular events’ [O’Neill et al., in rev.; Smith et al., 2001, 2009; Oppenheimer et al., 
2014], or ‘abrupt impacts’ [National Research Council, 2002, 2013], large-scale, non-linear 
shifts in the Earth system are often identified as a reason for concern about climate change 
[Oppenheimer et al., 2014] and a potential trigger of major economic losses, often described as 
‘economic catastrophes’ [Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000; Wagner and Weitzman, 2015]. Yet – as the 
multiple, nearly synonymous phrases suggest – the language used to describe such shifts is 
unsettled, and the link between physical changes and their socio-economic consequences is often 
unclear. To enhance cross-disciplinary communications between natural and social scientists 
working to assess the risks posed by climate-related tipping points and associated costs, this 
paper seeks to clarify terminology, critically review the underlying literature, and identify 
research directions in the integrated assessment of these large-scale changes. 
The phrase ‘tipping point’ appears to have originated in industry, where it referred 
literally to the point at which an engineered system, such as a rail wagon of coal in a Yorkshire 
foundry [Burnley, 1871] or a cup in a tilting water meter [Hoadley, 1883], tipped over and 
emptied its contents. The earliest use of the term in academic research occurred in the social 
sciences. In a Scientific American article, the political scientist Morton Grodzins [1957] applied 
the phrase ‘tip point’ to a critical proportion of non-whites in a neighborhood, above which the 
fraction of whites precipitously declines to zero. ‘Tip point’ and especially its variant ‘tipping 
point’ spread rapidly through the academic and policy literature on neighborhood segregation. 
(See the growth in the frequency of the phrase in the 1960s and 1970s shown in Figure 1a). 
Schelling [1971] introduced mathematical models of stability points in neighborhood segregation 
and discussed the conditions that could lead to the development of tipping points. 
Malcolm Gladwell popularized the term ‘tipping point’ in a New Yorker article [1996] 
and in his book The Tipping Point [2000], which identified several other examples, including the 
sudden increase in popularity of Hush Puppies shoes in 1995 and the sharp decline of crime in 
New York City in the mid-1990s. Gladwell [2000] summarized the characteristics of tipping 
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points as (1) being contagious and (2) involving a large change that (a) results from small 
changes and (b) occurs quickly. (Note the exponential growth of the frequency of ‘tipping point’ 
between 1997 and 2007, with a doubling time of ~2.4 years; Figure 1). The term’s emergence in 
climate research followed the Gladwell-inspired trend: Russill and Nyssa [2009] note a tipping 
point in the use of the phrase ‘tipping point’ in both popular and technical communications about 
climate change, reached around 2005-2007 amid the broader trend seen in Figure 1. (See the 
growth of academic publications using the phrases ‘climate change’ and ‘tipping points’ in 
Figure 1b.) 
The examples Gladwell provided of tipping points – epidemics of disease, crime, 
consumption, or behavior – all exhibit rapid shifts between states: specifically, from a state in 
which an infection or behavior is rare to one in which it is widespread. The scale and speed of 
the shifts result from positive feedbacks, in particular those related to network effects: the 
abundance of a contagious element increases the rate at which it spreads, which further increases 
its abundance. In ecology, such shifts are also known as ‘ecological thresholds’ or ‘regime shifts’ 
[e.g., Andersen et al., 2009], where “ecological regime shifts can be defined as abrupt changes 
… leading to rapid ecosystem reconfiguration between alternative states” [Andersen et al., 2009, 
p. 49]. As in the social sciences, a rapid state shift is a key part of the ecological definition. 
Lenton et al. [2008] formalized the concept of ‘tipping points’ in the climate system in a 
way that loosened this definition. Lenton et al. [2008] defined a ‘tipping element’ as a subsystem 
of the Earth system, subcontinental or larger, that small perturbations can shift into multiple 
different stable states. A tipping element’s tipping point is a critical threshold at which “a small 
change in forcing triggers a strongly nonlinear response in the internal dynamics of part of the 
climate system, qualitatively changing its future state” [Lenton, 2011, p.201]. Lenton [2013] 
noted that the triggering forcing might arise as a result of the level of forcing, the rate of forcing, 
or system noise. 
 Figure 2 illustrates the concept of a tipping element. In response to the changing forcing 
shown in Figure 2a, a tipping element (Figure 2e-f) changes linearly with forcing until the 
forcing reaches a critical threshold (indicated by the dotted vertical line). Once the forcing 
crosses the critical threshold (‘tipping point’), the tipping element undergoes a strongly nonlinear 
state shift. As shown in Figure 2g-h, tipping elements often exhibit hysteresis, so the forcing that 
triggers a transition from the first state to the second state may differ from the forcing that 
triggers a transition back into the first state. 
 In the literal example of the rail wagon of coal, the wagon itself would be the tipping 
element; the point at which the wagon’s physical dynamics commit it to falling on its side and 
emptying its contents would be the tipping point. Foundry workers might provide the intended 
forcing to tip the wagon; on poorly constructed tracks, system noise might cause it to rock and 
perhaps to tip at a different point than intended. The consequences for Yorkshire’s wagons was a 
supply of coal to a foundry’s furnaces (or a loss of coal for an unintended tip); for some Earth 
system tipping points, the consequences might be a large economic shock reflected in the cost of 
adapting to or suffering from the new state of the tipping element. 
Lenton et al. [2008]’s climatic definition retained the second element of Gladwell’s 
definition (a large change resulting from a small change). It softened the first element – like 
contagions, climatic tipping points involve positive feedbacks, but not necessarily the specific, 
network-based feedbacks that characterize contagions. Importantly, the climatic definition drops 
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Gladwell’s third element altogether: state shifts in climatic tipping elements need not occur 
rapidly, but can instead play out over an extended period of time. While the meaning of 
‘rapidity’ depends on scale, the difference between ‘committed’ and ‘realized’ change gives rise 
to a scale-invariant distinction. This distinction has an analogy in chemical systems, where 
kinetic rate limitation may cause a system’s transformation to lag significantly behind a shift in 
its equilibrium state. For some climatic tipping elements, a large committed change can occur 
rapidly as a result of a small change in forcing, though rate limitation may lead the realized 
change to occur slowly. For example, see Figure 2g-h, where the dashed lines indicate 
committed change, and the solid lines indicate realized change. 
Global mean sea-level (GMSL) rise illustrates this distinction. Kopp et al. [2014] 
estimated that, under the moderate-emissions Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP) 4.5 
(median projected warming of ~2.8°C above pre-Industrial by 2100), median projected realized 
GMSL rise for 2100 is about 0.6 m. By contrast, Levermann et al. [2013] estimated that the 
committed GMSL rise for 2.8°C of warming is about 6.4 m, and paleoclimatic evidence suggests 
that the committed rise may be higher still [Dutton et al., 2015] – but this commitment may take 
centuries or millennia to be realized. Although there is considerable uncertainty associated with 
projections of both realized and committed change in response to a given temperature forcing, 
the distinction between these two changes is broadly recognized in the sea-level literature and is 
tied primarily to lags within the ice sheet and deep ocean responses. 
The difference between committed and realized change is significant from a human 
perspective for three reasons. First, in some systems, the frictions that lead to a separation of 
realized and committed change may push the consequences of a tipping point beyond the time 
horizon of socio-economic relevance. For example, paleoclimatic evidence from the Last 
Interglacial suggests that the committed response to 2°C global warming above pre-Industrial 
temperatures may be about 6–9 m of GMSL rise [Kopp et al., 2009], but if these 6–9 m were to 
take millennia to be realized, humans and ecosystems might readily adapt to them at minimal 
cost – in which case they will be of little socio-economic consequence. (In Figure 2g, the rate at 
which the system shifts states is considerably slower than in Figure 2e). 
Second, some tipping elements exhibit early warning signs, such as a critical slowing 
down in rate of variability and an increase in the magnitude of variability, as they approach a 
critical threshold [Dakos et al., 2008; Scheffer et al., 2009, 2012; Lenton, 2011]. For a forcing 
that is rapid relative to a system’s timescale of variability, whether these warning signs are 
detectable will relate to the lag between commitment and realization. If there is little or no lag, 
there will be no opportunity for warning signs. Conversely, if there is a long lag that reflects a 
generally slow system response time, any early warning signs of a committed state shift may be 
too slow to identify. Useful early warning signs require both that the speed with which a state 
shift is realized is slow relative to the system’s timescale of variability, so that changes in rate or 
magnitude of variability have time to manifest before the realized state shift, and that the 
timescale of variability be sufficiently fast that such changes are detectable. 
Third, provided the committed state shift can be detected, lags between realized and 
committed changes may allow for interventions, either by reversing the forcing that originally 
tipped the system or by introducing a different forcing. For example, for some temperature-
triggered tipping points, bringing temperature back down below the tipping point quickly enough 
– before the previously committed change is fully realized – might avert some or all of that 
change. Reducing warming rapidly to 0°C after peaking at 2.8°C might avoid much of the 
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committed sea-level rise, but because of hysteresis, there is no guarantee. For instance, in Figure 
2g-h, the state shift continues well after the forcing starts to decrease. The desire to avoid 
committed state shifts has been an undercurrent in much of the discourse regarding ‘albedo 
modification’ or ‘solar radiation management’ (SRM), a climate engineering technique that can 
decrease global mean temperature [Bickel and Agrawal, 2012; Moreno-Cruz and Keith, 2012; 
Keith, 2013; Irvine et al., 2014; Heutel et al., 2015]. Some researchers suggest that SRM might 
in certain contexts reduce committed changes or slow their realization in a tipping element such 
as an ice sheet [Irvine et al., 2009; Applegate and Keller, 2015]; others argue that, by the time a 
committed state shift is recognized, significant change may be long locked in [Lenton, 2011; 
Barrett et al., 2014; Markusson et al., 2014; Sillmann et al., 2015]. 
Alternatively, though tipping points are generally defined with respect to a single type of 
forcing (e.g., temperature) while holding other forcings constant, a different type of forcing 
might change the commitment. For example, a cart sliding down a steep hill may be dynamically 
committed to landing at the bottom of the hill. If there is sufficient friction, however, there may 
be time to apply an external force to guide the cart onto a less steep slope and avoid the full, 
originally committed descent. Similarly, a permanent system for pumping water into the interior 
of the Antarctic ice sheet might – at enormous energetic cost – redefine the current sea-level rise 
commitment [Frieler et al., 2016]. 
Climate economists often link the economic consequences of tipping thresholds to 
sometimes elusively defined ‘economic catastrophes.’ For example, in Nordhaus and Boyer 
[2000]’s DICE-99 integrated assessment model (IAM), an estimated willingness to pay to avoid 
such catastrophes – 1.0% of output-weighted global GDP at 2.5°C and 6.9% of output-weighted 
global GDP at 6°C – constituted about two-thirds of the total estimated economic damage caused 
by climate change. That rough proportion of catastrophic to total damages remained through the 
2007 and 2010 revisions to DICE [Nordhaus, 2007]. 
Nordhaus and Boyer [2000]’s numbers were derived from an earlier survey of a group of 
economists and scientists [Nordhaus, 1994], which asked respondents to evaluate the probability 
that different climate pathways would cause a Great Depression-scale “high-consequence 
[economic] outcome,” defined as a 25% loss of global income [Nordhaus, 1994]. For a 3°C rise 
in global mean temperature in 2090, the estimated probabilities ranged from 0 to 30%, with a 
mean probability of 0.6% and a median probability of 5%. Natural scientists averaged 12%, 
while non-environmental economists averaged 0.4%. Noting growing concern about the 
possibility of what they now called ‘catastrophic’ impacts, Nordhaus and Boyer [2000] doubled 
the mean estimates of Nordhaus [1994] without further explanation and remapped the 3°C 
probability to 2.5°C. They estimated that, due to risk aversion, the willingness to pay to avoid 
such ‘catastrophic’ losses would be ~2-3 times the expected loss.  
Nordhaus [1994] neither asked his experts nor suggested to them how warming would 
cause a Great Depression-scale crisis. Nordhaus and Boyer [2000], however, offered a list of 
possible triggers for such ‘economic catastrophes.’ This list was rooted not in the economy, but 
in the physical climate, and bears a close resemblance to lists of potential climatic tipping points. 
“There are many concerns about catastrophic impacts of climate change,” they wrote. “Among 
the potential severe events are a sharp rise in sea level, shifting monsoons, a runaway greenhouse 
effect, collapse of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet, and changing ocean currents that would have a 
major cooling effect on some subregions” [Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000, p. 87]. They did not 
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further explore how such physical triggers might lead to a global Great Depression-scale 
economic loss. 
2 Terminology 
Muddled terminology has thus characterized the past two and a half decades of research 
on ‘catastrophic’, ‘singular’, ‘abrupt’, or ‘tipping’ impacts of climate change. We distinguish 
between tipping elements, tipping points, and climate-economic shocks. We apply the Lentonian 
definition of tipping elements: systems with critical thresholds, beyond which small perturbations 
in forcing can – as a result of positive feedbacks – lead to large, non-linear committed shifts in 
state. In our terminology, these tipping elements need not be limited to large-scale elements of 
the Earth system, but can also apply to social or engineered systems.  
We suggest a use of the term tipping point that is more restrictive than the term ‘critical 
threshold.’ Because of the demonstrable influence of Gladwell’s popularization, we suspect that 
non-specialists have something approximating the Gladwellian definition in mind when they 
hear the term, and that they therefore may be surprised to hear of ‘tipping points’ in which 
crossing a critical threshold may commit to a change that may not be realized rapidly but instead 
over centuries or millennia. We accordingly recommend that the term tipping point be reserved 
for Gladwellian critical thresholds, which we define as the critical thresholds exhibited by 
tipping elements with no significant lag between commitment and realization, and recommend 
that the generic term ‘critical threshold’ be used more broadly. 
The term ‘economic catastrophe’ is charged and poorly defined. Even though Nordhaus 
[1994] used a benchmark of a 25% decline in global income, which he called “the economic 
equivalent of the Great Depression”, it is unclear whether this statistic is relative to pre-decline 
output or to potential output. While GDP in the U.S. and Canada declined by 29% from 1929 to 
1933, summed data from the 67 countries with available statistics show a 10% ‘global’ decline in 
GDP from 1929 to 1932 (followed by an increase in 1933) [The Maddison Project, 2013]. In the 
61 countries with data available in 1921, total GDP was 27% lower in 1932 than it would have 
been had GDP growth continued at the 1921-1929 average annual rate. Two alternative 
interpretations of Nordhaus’s benchmark would thus be ‘a decline in global GDP comparable to 
that in North America during the Great Depression’ or ‘a decline in global GDP, relative to 
potential output, comparable to that during the Great Depression.’ Different surveyed experts 
may have  interpreted this statement differently. 
We recommend instead that the term climate-economic shock be used to refer to large 
economic losses triggered, directly or indirectly, by climate change. The qualifier ‘large,’ 
although not benchmarked, is intended to exclude shocks not readily identifiable above the 
natural background of weather shocks, while the use of the term ‘shock’ reflects the uncertainty 
around their occurrence. Climate-economic shocks may result from state shifts in climatic 
tipping elements (as suggested in the IAMs of Nordhaus [2000] and Hope [2013]) or climatically 
sensitive social tipping elements, but they may also result from the gradual effects of climate 
change. Moreover, not all state shifts in tipping elements – especially in non-Gladwellian tipping 
elements in which committed changes are realized over timescales long enough for ready human 
and ecological adaptation or other possible interventions – may lead to climate-economic shocks. 
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3 Climatic tipping elements 
Nordhaus and Boyer [2000]’s list highlighted some potential state shifts in climatic 
tipping elements: a rapid sea-level rise driven by West Antarctic Ice Sheet collapse or by other 
sources; shifts in weather patterns like the Indian Summer Monsoon or the West African 
Monsoon; shutdown of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC); or ‘runaway’ 
increases in climate sensitivity. Other studies have highlighted additional candidates, ranging 
from a collapse of Arctic summer sea ice, to ecological regime shifts in the Amazon or the Sahel, 
to a massive release of carbon from permafrost or seafloor methane hydrates [Lenton et al., 
2008; National Research Council, 2013]. Modeling studies have revealed the potential for an 
atmospheric superrotation threshold that rapidly increases climate sensitivity by changing 
planetary cloudiness [Caballero and Huber, 2013; Pierrehumbert, 2013], Arctic winter sea ice 
collapse, and an abrupt drop in the volume of snow on the Tibetan Plateau [Drijfhout et al., 
2015]. Some of these candidate tipping elements may exhibit Gladwellian tipping points, and so 
we categorize them as potentially Gladwellian tipping elements; others exhibit a non-
Gladwellian disconnect between committed and realized change, and so we categorize them as 
non-Gladwellian (see Table 1 for an illustrative list). Potentially Gladwellian tipping elements 
generally involve components of the Earth systems with response timescales on the order of a 
decade or less. These components – many of which play an important role in ‘fast’ climate 
feedbacks [e.g., PALAEOSENS Project, 2012] – include the atmosphere, the surface ocean, and 
sea ice; slower responding components, such as ice sheets or the deep ocean, introduce 
significant lags between commitment to a state shift and its realization. We describe some 
examples in greater depth below. 
3.1 Potentially Gladwellian tipping elements 
AMOC is perhaps the most iconic climatic tipping element, and paleoclimatic evidence 
suggests that it can indeed exhibit Gladwellian behavior. Reconstructions based on Atlantic basin 
carbon isotopic records [Sarnthein et al., 1994] suggest that AMOC exhibited three modes 
during the last 30,000 years: a “normal” mode, similar to today, with vigorous North Atlantic 
Deep Water (NADW) forming in the Nordic Sea; a “slowed down” mode, with reduced NADW 
formed to the south of Iceland; and a “collapsed” mode, in which NADW formation ceased and 
Antarctic Bottom Water filled the Atlantic basin [Alley and Clark, 1999; Rahmstorf, 2002]. 
Abrupt Dansgaard-Oeschger (D-O) climatic oscillations during the last glacial period 
[Dansgaard et al., 1982] are thought to be expressions of transition between the AMOC modes 
[Buizert and Schmittner, 2015]. Geochemical proxies from the Bermuda Rise show that 
slowdowns and collapses of the AMOC occurred during Heinrich events, when icebergs 
discharge into the North Atlantic freshened the surface water, with no evidence for lags [Böhm et 
al., 2015]. While D-O and Heinrich events occur during glacial periods, AMOC has also 
exhibited instability during past interglacials. Based on sedimentary carbon isotopes from Eirik 
Drift, near Greenland, Galaasen et al. [2014] found abrupt, multicentennial reduction in NADW 
during the Last Interglacial (~116–128 thousand years ago), with the largest and longest NADW 
reduction immediately following an outburst flood and a marked surface freshening event. 
AMOC stability has also been investigated with numerical models of various 
complexities [Stommel, 1961; Bryan, 1986; Hawkins et al., 2011; Weaver et al., 2012]. In 
models, the existence of stable multiple equilibria for AMOC relies on the salt-advection 
feedback [Stommel, 1961]: a weakened AMOC decreases salinity in the North Atlantic and thus 
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reduces the rate of deep water formation, which leads to further AMOC slowdown. In hosing 
experiments, which add freshwater to the North Atlantic, AMOC transitions to a collapsed mode 
once the input freshwater exceeds a threshold (~0.1-0.5 Sverdrups; [Rahmstorf, 2005]). AMOC 
also exhibits hysteresis: in order to restore the circulation once the system collapses, freshwater 
forcing must be reduced below a threshold that is smaller than the threshold originally required 
to cause the collapse [Rahmstorf, 1996, 2005; Hawkins et al., 2011]. Although Southern Ocean 
warming associated with increased radiative forcing may increase the stability of AMOC and the 
threshold for freshwater-induced AMOC collapse [Buizert and Schmittner, 2015], North Atlantic 
surface warming reduces the density of water there, which inhibits deep water formation and 
weakens the AMOC in CMIP5 models [Mikolajewicz and Voss, 2000; Gregory et al., 2005; 
National Research Council, 2013]. Therefore, AMOC strength is projected to decrease by the 
end of the century even in the low-emissions RCP 2.6 pathway; the magnitude of the decrease 
ranges between 5%–40% under RCP 4.5 and 15%–60% under RCP 8.5 [Weaver et al., 2012; 
Cheng et al., 2013]. A full collapse of AMOC in the 21st century is absent in most models except 
for FIO-ESM [Drijfhout et al., 2015]. Based on model projections, National Research Council 
[2013] concluded that an abrupt slowdown or collapse of the AMOC due to anthropogenic 
forcing is very unlikely to occur in the 21st century. 
AMOC transports a large amount of heat northward (up to 1x1015 W) [Ganachaud and 
Wunsch, 2000], so its changes have large impacts on regional temperature and precipitation in 
the North Atlantic and the Northern Hemisphere. The slowdown of AMOC may be an important 
contributing factor for the “global warming hole” in the North Atlantic south of Greenland 
[Drijfhout et al., 2012; Woollings et al., 2012b; Rahmstorf et al., 2015], where surface 
temperature displays a cooling trend that contrasts with the global warming trend [Rahmstorf et 
al., 2015]. Hosing experiments in coupled climate models [Laurian et al., 2009; Drijfhout, 2010, 
2015; Jackson et al., 2015] suggest that full collapse of the AMOC results in a significant 
northern hemisphere cooling (~2-5°C in the subtropical gyre [Jackson et al., 2015]) and modest 
southern hemisphere warming (<1°C in most regions; [Jackson et al., 2015]). These asymmetric 
temperature changes led to a decrease in global mean temperature (~0.7°C in the 
ECHAM5/MPI-OM model [Laurian et al., 2009]) that offsets about ~15-20 years of global 
warming and causes a ~40-50 year warming hiatus [Drijfhout, 2015]. AMOC slowdown could 
also impact atmospheric circulations in several ways, including strengthening the North Atlantic 
storm track or reducing the frequency of ‘polar low’ cyclones in the subpolar North Atlantic 
[Woollings et al., 2012a, 2012b]. It could also lead to poleward expansion of Hadley cells 
[Drijfhout, 2010], which may decrease precipitation over the Northern Hemispheric mid-
latitudes and shift the Intertropical Convergence Zone southward [Jackson et al., 2015]. The 
general cooling and atmospheric circulation changes would result in weaker peak river flows and 
vegetation productivity, which may raise issues of water availability and crop production 
[Jackson et al., 2015]. Slowdown of the AMOC would also cause large and potentially rapid 
dynamic sea level changes; a collapse could raise sea level along the North American Atlantic 
coast by as much as ~0.5 m [Gregory and Lowe, 2000; Levermann et al., 2005].  
Both observational and modeling evidence suggests that, if it is a true tipping element, 
Arctic sea ice exhibits Gladwellian behavior. Observations show a significant decrease in sea-
ice area in response to recent warming, with linear trends of –54.6 ± 3.7 x103 km2/year annually 
and –89.0 ± 9.5 x103 km2/year in September between 1978 and 2013 [Stroeve et al., 2011, 2012; 
Simmonds, 2015]. Using the ECHAM5/MPI-OM GCM, Li et al. [2013] found no lag between 
changes in Northern Hemispheric temperature and changes Arctic sea ice area. Arctic sea ice 
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also has the potential to be a tipping element, as sea-ice loss can be amplified by feedbacks 
involving ice albedo, the warming effects of convective clouds, the open-water formation 
efficiency of thin ice, and the increased temperature responsiveness of thinner, younger ice 
[Drijfhout et al., 2015]. 
Energy balance models and single column models [Rose and Marshall, 2009; Björk et al., 
2013] suggest that Arctic sea ice has a critical threshold below which rapid ice-cover shrinkage 
will occur and lead the Arctic to be seasonally ice free [Notz, 2009]. Bjork et al. [2013] placed 
this threshold at an annual-mean ice thickness of 1.7–2.0 m, but the tipping behavior of Arctic 
sea ice simulated in comprehensive GCMs is still controversial [Armour et al., 2011; Ridley et 
al., 2012; Li et al., 2013; Wagner and Eisenman, 2015]. In ECHAM5/MPI-OM, Li et al. [2013] 
found that summer sea-ice area declines linearly in response to increased CO2 concentration, 
while winter sea-ice area shows a rapid transition (at a temperature higher than that which causes 
a complete loss of summer sea ice) to a nearly ice-free state. On the other hand, an abrupt 
transition of Arctic sea ice is not found in any season in CCSM3 [Armour et al., 2011] or 
HadCM3 [Ridley et al., 2012]. There is also no consensus on the persistence or hysteresis of 
Arctic sea decline in comprehensive GCMs [Armour et al., 2011; Li et al., 2013; Wagner and 
Eisenman, 2015]. In CMIP5 climate models, increasing greenhouse gas are projected to drive a 
steady decrease in Arctic sea ice, with a possibility of ice-free summer within a few decades 
[Stroeve et al., 2012; Overland and Wang, 2013; Overland et al., 2014]. Five CMIP5 models 
show an abrupt winter Arctic sea-ice abruptly collapse in the 22nd century in RCP8.5 simulations 
[Drijfhout et al., 2015]. Overall, the evidence that winter Arctic sea ice is a tipping element is 
stronger than for summer Arctic sea ice. However, Bathiany et al. [2016] argue that the 
abruptness of winter Arctic sea ice collapse can be explained by a threshold without positive 
feedbacks, simply from a basinwide failure to cool sufficiently to allow ice formation; if they are 
correct, neither winter nor summer Arctic sea ice may be tipping elements. 
A rapid decrease in Arctic sea ice could have far-reaching consequences. Arctic sea ice 
and the ice-albedo feedback are an important contributor to Arctic amplification, the 
phenomenon that surface warming over the Arctic is more rapid than at lower latitudes. Arctic 
amplification may slow down the mid-latitude jet streams, shift storm tracks over the North 
Atlantic, and increase the vertical propagation of energy into the stratosphere, which may lead to 
more frequent extreme weather events across the Northern Hemisphere mid-latitudes [Francis 
and Vavrus, 2012, 2015; Cohen et al., 2014; Tang et al., 2014]. However, some studies argue 
that the chance of mid-latitude cold extremes should decrease in response to future sea ice loss 
[Hassanzadeh et al., 2014; Screen et al., 2014]. In addition, this rapid warming over the Arctic 
due to sea-ice reduction may consequently increase the emission of methane from high-latitude 
wetland soils; Parmentier et al. [2015] estimated that methane emission over high-latitudes for 
2005–2010 are averagely ~1.7 Tg  yr−1 higher than that during 1981–1990 due to a sea ice-
induced warming in fall.  
The West African monsoon (WAM) may be another example of a Gladwellian tipping 
element. WAM contributes the bulk of Sahelian summer rainfall [Dong and Sutton, 2015]. 
Paleoclimatic evidence suggests that the bistability of the WAM is characterized by alternating 
status between long-lasting (decades to centuries) episodes of dry and wet conditions [Shanahan 
et al., 2009]. Both paleoclimatic reconstructions [Asmerom et al., 2013] and GCM simulations 
[Giannini et al., 2003; Hoerling et al., 2006; Martin et al., 2014] suggests that the switch 
between these two quasi-stable states is driven by changing sea surface temperatures (SST) 
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around Africa. Sediment-core and tree-ring reconstructions indicate that the WAM variability is 
coherent and in phase with the Atlantic SST variability at multidecadal time scale [Shanahan et 
al., 2009], suggesting Gladwellian behavior. The transition of WAM to its strong phase is 
associated with a wind-evaporation-SST positive feedback [Xie, 1999]: warming in SST in the 
North Atlantic relative to the South Atlantic drives stronger westerly winds and enhances the 
WAM, which reduces surface evaporation north of the equator and enhances it in the south, 
amplifying the interhemispheric SST gradient. In addition, a switch to strong WAM may also 
rely on the Saharan water vapor–temperature feedback [Evan et al., 2015]: long-wave radiation 
of surface water vapor raises the surface air temperature, which increases the low-level moisture 
convergence around the Saharan heat low.  
An enhanced WAM driven by anthropogenic greenhouse gas and aerosol forcing may 
have led to the substantial recovery of Sahel rainfall since the 1980s [Dong and Sutton, 2015]. 
Under RCP 8.5, about 80% of CMIP5 models agree on a modest drying around 20% over the 
westernmost Sahel (15°–5°W), while about 75% of models agree on an increase in precipitation 
over the Sahel between 0°and 30°E, with a large spread on the amplitude [Roehrig et al., 2013]. 
However, the CMIP5 models may underestimate the monsoon decadal variability, due to strong 
biases in simulated SST [Roehrig et al., 2013]. One model, BNU-ESM, found an abrupt increase 
in Sahel vegetation cover around 2050 in the RCP8.5 simulation [Drijfhout et al., 2015]. The 
projected WAM strengthening is related to a robust amplification of warming over the Sahel by 
about 10%–50% over the global mean [Roehrig et al., 2013]. Furthermore, the warming pattern 
induced by enhanced WAM facilitates the development of African easterly waves (AEWs), 
which are westward-propagating weather disturbances over North Africa during summer. In 
RCP8.5 simulations between 2075 and 2100, the occurrence frequency increased with a multi-
model average of 39% for intense AEWs and of 72% for extremely intense AEWs along the 
Sahel−Sahara border [Skinner and Diffenbaugh, 2014]. The elevated AEW activity could further 
increase the Sahel rainfall, and strengthen Sahara dust transportation over Africa and Atlantic 
[Skinner and Diffenbaugh, 2014]. 
3.2 Non-Gladwellian tipping elements 
Ice sheet melt provides clear examples of non-Gladwellian behavior. For the Greenland 
Ice Sheet, for example, feedbacks between ice sheet topography and atmospheric dynamics and 
between ice area and albedo give rise to multiple stable states [Ridley et al., 2009; Robinson et 
al., 2012; Levermann et al., 2013]. Robinson et al. [2012]’s coupled ice-sheet/regional climate 
model indicated that, at a temperature of 1°C above pre-Industrial, the stable states are at 100%, 
60%, and 20% of present ice volume. At 1.6°C, however, their model produced only one stable 
configuration, at ~15% of the Greenland ice sheet’s present volume; thus, 1.6°C warming would 
represent a commitment to ~6 m of sea-level rise from the Greenland Ice Sheet. The rate of ice 
sheet mass loss is, however, limited by the flux at the ice sheet margins [e.g., Pfeffer et al., 
2008], leading to a disconnect between committed and realized change that could persist for 
millennia, particularly for levels of warming near the threshold [Applegate et al., 2015]. 
In Antarctica, where about 23 m sea-level equivalent of ice sits vulnerably with its base 
below sea level [Fretwell et al., 2013], ice sheet mass loss is dominated by ocean/ice sheet/ice 
shelf interactions. For parts of the ice sheet sitting on reverse bed slopes, which shallow outward, 
a positive feedback sets up the marine ice sheet instability [Schoof, 2007; Gomez et al., 2010; 
Ritz et al., 2015]: as the ice sheet retreats, it thickens vertically, increasing ice sheet discharge 
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and thus the rate of retreat. Such an instability appears to be occurring in multiple outlet glaciers 
of the Amundsen Sea Embayment sector of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet, creating a sea-level rise 
commitment that could equal much or all of the 1.2 m sea-level equivalent in this sector [Joughin 
et al., 2014; Rignot et al., 2014]. In Wilkes Basin in East Antarctica, the instability threshold has 
not yet been crossed, but removal of an ‘ice plug’ containing ~8 cm sea-level equivalent could 
create a 3-4 m sea-level rise commitment [Mengel and Levermann, 2014]. Ice shelf buttressing 
can inhibit marine ice sheet instability, however, so some marine-based sectors may not exhibit 
threshold behavior but instead respond nearly linearly to sub-shelf temperature [Mengel et al., 
2016]. On the other hand, most ice sheet models do not include ice cliff collapse and 
hydrofracturing, which destabilize ice shelves and may greatly increase the rate of ice sheet mass 
loss [Pollard et al., 2015; DeConto and Pollard, 2016]. Overall, the Antarctic ice sheet exhibits a 
clear separation between realized and committed change, and individual sectors of the ice sheet 
can exhibit threshold behavior associated with marine ice sheet instability. It is unclear, however, 
whether threshold behavior occurs at the aggregate level of the ice sheet as a whole [Levermann 
et al., 2013]. 
Model evidence also suggests that large-scale ecosystems can exhibit a non-Gladwellian 
lag between committed and realized state shifts. Using the HadCM3LC climate/carbon cycle 
model, which was one of the first to include a dynamic vegetation component, Jones et al. 
[2009] found a precipitous committed collapse in Amazon forest cover between 1°C and 3°C 
warming, even though the realized loss when their simulation reached 3°C was minimal. 
Similarly, they found a committed tripling of boreal forest cover at ~4°C warming, even though 
the realized expansion was minimal. These results were not consistent across models [Cox et al., 
2013]; among model participating in the Coupled Climate Carbon Cycle Model Intercomparison 
Project (C4MIP) exercise, only the HadCM3 models showed a net reduction in tropical land 
carbon over the 21st century. Conditioning the C4MIP models on the observed inter-annual 
variations in CO2 growth rate over 1960-2010 suggested that the tropical forests in the HadCM3 
models are overly sensitive to warming [Cox et al., 2013], but to our knowledge no other models 
have been used to investigate the distinction between committed and realized ecosystem change. 
3.3 Common worrisome traits of candidate climatic tipping elements 
Some candidate tipping elements exhibit full-fledged Gladwellian tipping points, others 
exhibit non-Gladwellian critical thresholds, and some, upon further investigation, may turn out 
not to be tipping elements at all. But most of these ambiguous candidate tipping elements 
unambiguously exhibit other worrisome traits. First, almost all are characterized by deep 
uncertainty [Kasperson, 2008; Heal and Millner, 2014; Convery and Wagner, 2015], meaning 
that there are multiple plausible probability distributions that could be constructed for how likely 
they are to occur, how fast they will occur, and what their consequences could be. This deep 
uncertainty complicates efforts to devise policies to minimize negative consequences. Second, 
and closely related, they are absent from many of the coupled climate models used to project 
future changes: some models will generate the tipping behavior, some will not, and some are 
missing the element of the Earth system that could generate them. Third, many are rate-limited 
and so exhibit a committed change significantly larger than the initially realized change. Fourth, 
many exhibit hysteresis, so reversing a change in the system may require a larger forcing and/or 
more time than causing the change in the first place.  
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For example, the reservoir of soil organic carbon in the Arctic permafrost may or may 
not abruptly ‘tip’. Arctic permafrost holds at least ~1300-1600 Gt C [Schuur et al., 2015]; as the 
Arctic warms, microbes will transform this organic carbon into CO2 and CH4. If all of this 
carbon were instantaneously released as CO2, it would likely cause a global mean warming of 
~1-3°C. Thus, there could be a positive feedback large enough to create a tipping point: the 
release of carbon could warm the planet enough to significantly accelerate the rate of carbon 
release. Moreover, laboratory incubations show that some organic-rich permafrost soils can 
decompose rapidly, with up to ~7% of organic C being lost in the first unfrozen year, [Schädel et 
al., 2014] and that abrupt permafrost thaw is common phenomenon in parts of the Arctic [e.g., 
Jorgenson et al., 2006]. 
Yet the real-world rate of permafrost carbon release is limited by the annual freeze-thaw 
cycle, by the rate of thermal diffusion into the deep permafrost, by the creation of new biomass, 
and by oxygen availability in water-logged soils [Schuur et al., 2015]. (Anaerobic decomposition 
creates methane, but current estimates indicate the higher warming potential of methane is 
insufficient to offset the decreased decomposition rate in oxygen-depleted soils.) A 17-author 
expert assessment estimated that ~5-15% of permafrost C is vulnerable to decomposition in the 
21st century, and model projections suggested a somewhat larger share vulnerable to 
decomposition in the 22nd and 23rd centuries [Schuur et al., 2015]. If this assessment is correct, 
then the permafrost feedback on warming will be too small to be the principle driver of 
permafrost melt; there will be no threshold beyond which the momentum of escalating 
permafrost emissions carries the world to a permafrost-free state. 
Nonetheless, Arctic permafrost carbon still shares the four other traits common to many 
tipping elements – deep uncertainty, incomplete treatment in climate models, a separation 
between committed and realized change, and hysteresis. It thus revises our understanding of the 
coupled climate/carbon cycle system.  
A significant body of work over the last decade has shown that global mean warming 
increases approximately linearly with cumulative carbon dioxide emissions, and that global mean 
temperature is stable for centuries after emissions stop [e.g., Matthews and Caldeira, 2008; Allen 
et al., 2009; Solomon et al., 2009]. The IPCC concluded that “the principal driver of long-term 
warming is total emissions of CO2 and the two quantities are approximately linearly related” 
[Collins et al., 2013, p.1033]. These conclusions gave rise to the ‘carbon budget’ paradigm now 
common in policy discourse. But the models that led to these conclusions did not include 
permafrost carbon. Some newer Earth system models have incorporated the permafrost carbon 
feedback, at least in part. Schaefer et al. [2014]’s synthesis found a mean initial carbon pool 
among thirteen published studies of ~800 Gt C, roughly half the observational estimate. These 
models found that the permafrost carbon feedback lags anthropogenic emissions, giving rise to a 
difference between committed and realized emissions similar to that for ice sheet melt. As a 
consequence, the approximation that warming is proportional to cumulative anthropogenic CO2 
emissions fails, and warming may continue after human emissions stop [MacDougall et al., 
2012].  
Using the UVic ESCM, an Earth system model of intermediate complexity (EMIC), 
MacDougall et al. [2015] found that incorporating the permafrost carbon feedback led to a ~10% 
reduction in the carbon budget for 2°C warming. The permafrost carbon feedback similarly led 
to an increase of ~10% in the amount of net anthropogenic carbon removal needed to restore a 
2°C warming after overshooting to 3.2°C. Using another EMIC, IAP RAS CM, Eliseev et al. 
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[2013] demonstrated hysteresis in the permafrost system, showing that permafrost melted faster 
in a warming world than it regrew in a cooling world at the same temperature. 
3.4 Integrated assessment of climatic tipping elements 
Regardless of whether all proposed tipping elements do in fact tip, their potential state 
shifts are hazards; it is therefore worthwhile to identify and assess climate-economic shocks that 
they might cause. Indeed, since abstract ‘catastrophic’ impacts dominate damage estimates in 
two of the most commonly used benefit-cost IAMs, DICE and PAGE [Hope, 2013], improving 
their representation in IAMs may be critical to more accurate estimates of the cost of climate 
change [Revesz et al., 2014]. 
Lenton and Ciscar [2013] outlined one strategy for a stylized improvement of climatic 
tipping element representation in benefit-cost IAMs. A number of subsequent studies have 
focused on the welfare costs of uncalibrated or idealized ‘tipping points’. Lemoine and Traeger 
[2014] examine uncalibrated, instantaneous changes in climate sensitivity or carbon sinks in a 
variant of the DICE model; Lemoine and Traeger [2016] expanded this study to include ‘tipping 
points’ that affect the damage function directly and also show interactions between ‘tipping 
points.’ Daniel et al. [2015] decompose the impact of risk aversion to ‘tipping points’ from 
climate damages. Lontzek et al. [2015] consider a single idealized critical threshold in the 
damage function with a range of transition scales and final damage levels. Cai et al. [2016] 
implemented five interacting tipping elements (AMOC, West Antarctic Ice Sheet, Greenland ice 
sheet, the Amazon dieback, and El Niño-Southern Oscillation) with critical threshold 
probabilities calibrated to the expert elicitation study of Kriegler et al. [2009], transition 
timescales based on literature reviews, and economic consequences based upon the authors’ 
intuition. 
We propose an alternative strategy for improving representation of state shifts in tipping 
elements that draws upon more disaggregated models of climate change impacts [e.g., 
Warszawski et al., 2014; Houser et al., 2015]. For risk and impact assessment, potential climatic 
tipping elements can be categorized by the physical parameters they affect that influence human 
systems. (For simplicity, we will put aside the qualification ‘potential’ and refer to all potential 
tipping elements simply as ‘tipping elements’ for the remainder of this section.) Some tipping 
elements affect global warming, either through planetary albedo (e.g., Arctic sea ice) or the 
greenhouse effect (e.g., permafrost). Some tipping elements influence on regional temperature or 
precipitation (e.g., changes in AMOC or Arctic sea ice). Tipping elements involving polar ice 
sheets affect global mean sea level, and some tipping elements (e.g., AMOC) influence regional 
dynamic sea level. Finally, some tipping elements involve major ecosystems such as the 
Amazon, which may influence not only the greenhouse effect but also the regional availability of 
ecosystem services. Each category is amenable to a different risk assessment strategy. 
Both benefit-cost IAMs like DICE and some newer frameworks based on empirical and 
process model of climate change impacts [e.g., Houser et al., 2015] use simple climate models 
(SCMs) to project global mean temperature change. Tipping elements that affect global mean 
temperature could be incorporated into these SCMs. Although subject to well-known concerns 
about the damage functions in benefit-cost IAMs [e.g., Revesz et al., 2014], two studies have 
already attempted this for permafrost carbon. Hope and Schaefer [2016] augmented the PAGE09 
IAM [Hope, 2013] with time series of permafrost CO2 and CH4 emissions [Schaefer et al., 
2011]. They found that permafrost emissions increased the net present value cost of climate 
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change by ~13%, consistent with the associated increased in cumulative CO2 emissions. 
González-Eguino and Neumann [2016] conducted a similar study with DICE-2013R. Similar 
approaches could be used to study the global mean temperature effect of Arctic albedo changes 
due to sea-ice collapse or boreal forest expansion, of a superrotation-induced decrease in 
cloudiness and increase in climate sensitivity, or of rapid changes in the land or ocean carbon 
sinks. 
Many tipping elements, however, have regional temperature and precipitation effects that 
extend beyond a scaling of regional changes with global mean temperature. Arctic sea ice loss 
decreases the pole-to-equator temperature gradient, which may affect the frequency of mid-
latitude weather patterns [Overland et al., 2015]. A reduction or collapse of AMOC has strong 
cooling effects in Europe, weaker cooling effects more broadly in the Northern Hemisphere, 
warming effects in the Southern Hemisphere, a southward shift in the Intertropical Convergence 
Zone, and sea-level rise in the North Atlantic [Vellinga and Wood, 2002; Levermann et al., 2013; 
Jackson et al., 2015]. A change in ENSO frequency or intensity would have temperature and 
precipitation effects around the world [Power et al., 2013; Cai et al., 2014; Latif et al., 2015; 
Yuan et al., 2015]. GCMs must be used to identify the spatial and temporal patterns associated 
with state shifts in such tipping elements. Either direct GCM output or the extracted patterns can 
then be combined with empirical [e.g., Dell et al., 2014] or process [e.g., Warszawski et al., 
2014] models to estimate regional impacts and damage functions that go beyond temperature 
impacts. 
A number of studies have attempted to assess the economic impact of AMOC collapse. 
Some [e.g., Keller et al., 2000, 2004; Mastrandrea and Schneider, 2001] have linked simple 
models of AMOC stability to arbitrary perturbations of the damage function of a simple benefit-
cost IAM like DICE. Link and Tol [2010] combined the spatial pattern of AMOC collapse from 
an experiment with the HadCM3 GCM with the impact functions from the FUND 2.8 IAM, 
which has temperature-driven damage functions for each of 16 regions and six impact categories. 
They found a small global effect (a ~0.1% reduction in global GDP in 2100), though larger 
negative effects (up to ~4% of GDP) in a few, mostly high-latitude countries. Kuhlbrodt et al. 
[2009] linked the temperature, precipitation, cloudiness and pressure precipitation projections 
downscaled from the Climber-3a intermediate-complexity Earth system model to the LPJmL 
dynamic vegetation model to assess the effect of an AMOC shutdown on European crop 
production; they found a fairly limited effect. Link and Tol [2009] linked the ocean temperature 
and AMOC projections of Climber-3a to a bioeconomic model of the Barents Sea cod fishery. 
They found that the direct effect of AMOC weakening on survival rates could lead to a fisheries 
collapse. Similar studies could be conducted for other tipping elements with regional climatic 
effects, and the empirical climate impact functions increasingly emerging in the econometric 
literature could be leveraged to link regional climate changes to their socio-economic 
consequences [e.g., Dell et al., 2014]. 
State shifts in ice-sheet tipping elements are conceptually the easiest to incorporate into 
risk assessments. Their primary impact is to change rates of sea-level rise, and so they can be 
assessed in the same frameworks used to assess sea-level rise impacts more broadly. For 
example, Nicholls et al. [2008] forced the FUND model with West Antarctic Ice Sheet collapse, 
represented by 5 m of global-mean sea-level rise in a period as short as 100 years. For a century-
timescale collapse, they found a ~40% drop in the length of the coastlines that it was benefit-cost 
optimal to protect, and a 15-fold increase in annual protection costs. Diaz [2015] and Diaz and 
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Keller [2016] extended DICE with a stochastic representation of West Antarctic Ice Sheet 
collapse, with collapse probabilities loosely calibrated against the expert elicitation study of 
Bamber and Aspinall [2013]. 
Arguably, the possibility of large-scale ice-sheet collapse is already built into some 
probabilistic sea-level rise projections [e.g., Kopp et al., 2014], though these may understate the 
probability of this outcome [DeConto and Pollard, 2016]. For example, the Kopp et al. [2014] 
99.9th percentile projections align with other estimates of the maximum physically plausible level 
of 21st century sea-level rise (~2.5 m) and require > 95 cm of rise driven by the Antarctic ice 
sheet in the 21st century. However, risk assessments based on these projections [Houser et al., 
2015] have not examined outcomes that far into the tail of the analysis. Deliberate inspection of 
such tail risks would provide a natural way of incorporating ice-sheet tipping elements into 
coastal risk assessments.  
Ecological tipping elements may be the hardest to incorporate into economic risk 
assessments, particularly at a global scale. The difficulty reflects the state of the field of 
ecosystem services valuation. Generally, assessments of ecosystem services are either narrowly 
focused [e.g., Jenkins et al., 2010] or fairly vague [e.g., Costanza et al., 1997; de Groot et al., 
2012]. The easiest risks of large-scale ecosystem changes to assess may be those that feedback 
onto global radiative balance, through either changes in the carbon cycle or changes in land 
surface albedo. 
In summary, potential climate-economic shocks associated with state shifts in different 
tipping elements can be independently assessed, for example, by (1) linking simple climate 
model scenarios for elements that affect greenhouse gas concentrations or albedo to impact 
models and (2) incorporating regional spatial-temporal patterns associated with tipping elements 
with regional climatic effects to impact models. Some tipping elements are driven by natural-
system variables only partially reflected in current Earth system models and thus require 
alternative approaches, such as (3) extending coastal risk assessments into the tail of sea-level 
rise probability distributions, which should incorporate the possibility of rapid ice-sheet melt; 
and (4) tallying the net costs of climate impacts on monetizable ecosystem services. However, 
tipping elements are not necessarily independent of one another [e.g., Kriegler et al., 2009], so 
when estimating the economic risks of different elements, it is important to consider the 
correlations between different thresholds. For example, rapid Greenland ice mass loss increases 
the probability of AMOC collapse, which in turn leads to Southern Ocean warming and increases 
the probability of rapid West Antarctic Ice Sheet mass loss. In addition, the framework laid out 
above focuses on how a state shift in a tipping element may cause different individual types of 
impacts, but it is also important to consider how these impacts interact across sectors [e.g., 
Warren, 2011]. Severe negative (or positive) impacts on agriculture, for example, will affect 
food prices and lead to changes in economic structure. Similarly, migration away from coastlines 
could have either negative or positive economic effects. It is also important to keep in mind that 
one effect of a state shift may be to change the temporal and spatial correlations between extreme 
events, making once-rare ‘black swan’ [Taleb, 2007] alignments of extremes much more likely. 
4 Climatically sensitive social tipping elements 
Given the sociological origins of the modern ‘tipping point’ concept, it is perhaps 
surprising that climate change tipping point research has focused almost exclusively on tipping 
elements in natural systems, leaving climatically relevant social tipping elements mostly 
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unexplored. Broader social change theory has, however, recognized that change is often not 
gradual. Moser and Dilling [2007] identified four typical stages of social transformation that 
together form a S-curve. In the “predevelopment” phase, the system is in one stable state. During 
“take off,” it begins to accelerate towards a new state. The third stage, which they titled 
“breakthrough,” is the tipping point, where the rate of change accelerates until it reaches the 
fourth stage, “stabilization” in a new state. Influencing this accelerating rate of social change is 
typically a positive feedback mechanism involving network diffusion, by which one actor (e.g., a 
household, a legislature, or a corporation) changes, and others – via social cues – exponentially 
follow suit. Social tipping points can influence climate change, and climate change can influence 
social tipping points. Similarly, economic shocks may both cause and be caused by social tipping 
points.  
Like climatic tipping elements, social tipping elements both involve positive feedbacks 
and exhibit non-linear rates of change. This is a more restrictive definition of social tipping 
points than what is sometimes applied in the social scientific literature.  While there are robust 
research fields that recognize thresholds in human-climate systems, they generally lack an 
explicit focus on positive feedbacks within social systems, instead considering the more generic 
case of systems with thresholds, like those shown in Figure 2b-d. For example, Bardsley and 
Hugo [2010, p.243] define a migration threshold as “a point at which the impacts of climate 
change are so severe or so frequent that the resilience of socio-ecological systems is breached, or 
that existing in situ adaptation options either fail or are perceived as inadequate, so that people 
make use of migration as an adaptation option in a manner that will fundamentally alter the form 
migration is taking”. While migration can be a tipping element, this description does not capture 
the role of the feedbacks that make it such. Other researchers have found that as climate change 
impacts increase in magnitude, there is a threshold where individuals’ responses change from 
being adaptive to maladaptive [Niemeyer et al., 2005]. Researchers conducting interviews that 
presented worsening climate change scenarios saw an increase in the “adaptive response” of 
concern and action for a warming scenario (2.5°C). When this scenario shifted to a greater 
magnitude of climate change (5°C), the researchers observed an increase in apprehension and a 
decline in trust and perceptions that institutions and other social actors will respond.  The 
researchers saw this as an increase in maladaptation and suggest that there is a threshold between 
2.5°C and 5°C at which people become less adaptive.  This study suggests a threshold in social 
behavior, but not a positive feedback mechanism through which it occurs.  In addition, socio-
ecological studies examine how human actions, climate change, and other factors trigger 
ecological regime shifts, but the tipping elements in these studies are ecological, not social 
[Kinzig et al., 2006]. 
The term ‘adaptation tipping point’ [Kwadijk et al., 2010; Werners et al., 2013; Koukoui 
et al., 2015] has been occasionally used in the literature to refer to sigmoidal changes in the 
frequency of extreme events above a threshold at which “the current management strategy will 
no longer be able to meet [its] objectives” [Kwadijk et al., 2010, p. 730]. We advise against this 
use, as it is inconsistent with other uses of the term ‘tipping point.’ Although tipping points 
proper do produce sigmoidal changes, the sigmoidal changes associated with ‘adaptation tipping 
points’ do not arise from positive feedbacks and thus lack a crucial characteristic of true tipping 
points. They are simply a product of extreme value statistics, by which the number of 
exceedances of a threshold can grow approximately exponentially in response to a linear increase 
in the mean of a distribution. For example, the historical 1% average annual probability flood at 
the Battery tide gauge in New York City is ~1.8 m above mean high water. With 50 cm of sea-
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level rise, the expected number of such floods increases about 5 times; with 100 cm, by about 40 
times, and with 150 cm, by about 2000 times [Buchanan et al., 2016]. If current management 
strategies cannot cope with a ‘1-in-100 year’ flood occurring with an annual probability >10%, 
the ‘adaptation tipping point’ would occur when sea-level rise exceeded ~70 cm. 
Social tipping points can be beneficial, costly, or neutral to human welfare. Beneficial 
social tipping points increase societal resilience and reduce climate change damages via 
mitigation or adaptation. Harmful social tipping points are more likely to occur where there are 
low levels of societal resilience, under which societal risks increase because of failure to 
effectively adapt or mitigate. Potential social tipping elements that are relevant to integrated 
assessment of the costs of climate change include (1) public opinion and policy change, (2) 
technology and behavior adoption for adaptation or mitigation, (3) migration, and (4) civil 
conflict.  
In environmental policy, the theory of ‘punctuated equilibrium’ explains intervals of 
long-term policy stasis and incrementalism, interrupted by abrupt changes to a new policy state 
[Baumgartner et al., 2014]. These “explosive change[s] for a short while” lead to “the 
establishment of a new policy equilibrium” [Baumgartner et al., 2014, p.61]. Unity in public 
opinion on an environmental issue, decreasing unity in opposition to policy change by negatively 
affected interest groups, and governmental openness to policy change can all influence policy 
change [Shwom, 2011]. These underlying factors are social phenomena that can experience 
positive feedbacks related to network influencer effects [Watts and Dodds, 2007]. 
Social scientists use “‘sand-pile’ models, ‘tipping point’ models, ‘small world’ models 
and other graph theoretic models, ‘complex adaptive systems models’, and models that produce 
punctuated dynamics via a hierarchy of time scales” [Brock, 2006, p.49] to capture the non-
linearity of social change dynamics. Modeling environmental policy change suffers from the 
typical modeling challenges for complex social systems, including the identification problem 
(identifying what variables should be included in the models). Our review did not find any 
models of public opinion or politics of climate change, though there are a number of models of 
punctuated equilibrium and environmental policy change (see [Repetto, 2008] and [Garmestani, 
2014] for reviews). 
Climate change mitigation and adaptation require adoption of new technologies and 
behaviors. For example, to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, society will need to adopt energy-
efficient and low-carbon energy technologies. Researchers have historically used logistic 
substitution models to represent energy technology uptake over time [e.g., Marchetti and 
Nakicenovic, 1979]. Energy technologies exhibit a gradual diffusion in the introductory phase, 
then experience exponential growth as the learning curve and up-scaling of a technology takes 
place (the tipping point), after which growth tapers off as the technology approaches saturation 
[Grübler et al., 1999]. Wilson [2012] mapped a variety of energy production technologies and 
their capacity in the Netherlands over time and found that fossil fuel, nuclear, and renewable 
energy technologies all exhibit this general pattern, though length of time in each phase varies. 
The “epidemic” model of technology diffusion [Geroski, 2000] posits that technology 
adoption is dependent upon information availability and experience spread through networks 
[Rogers, 2003]. For example, farmers in the Philippines used relatives and neighbors as a reliable 
source of information and credit to help adapt to drought [Acosta-Michlik and Espaldon, 2008]. 
Because proximity influences social networks and cues (e.g., a solar panel is visible on a 
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neighbor’s roof), spatial agent-based models have been used to model technology diffusion and 
adoption processes [Berger, 2001; Noonan et al., 2015]. Many technological adaptations, such as 
raising houses, adopting air-conditioners, or modifying farming techniques, are innovations that 
experience these network feedbacks and will diffuse following a logistic curve.  
Recent models of technology adoption have evolved beyond the diffusion curve to 
provide system-dynamic accounts. Approaches like energy innovation systems [Gallagher et al., 
2012] and socio-technical systems transitions [Geels, 2005; Geels and Schot, 2007] embed 
technology adoption within supply and demand dynamics, sources of technology change, the 
technology development cycle, innovation processes, and feedbacks between networks of actors 
and institutions. Learning and experience curves have been used as the basis for endogenous 
technological change in a number of formal models, but not without critique [see Wilson, 2012]. 
Clarke et al. [2008, p.413] highlight that “although learning-by-doing may be one of the factors 
underlying these curves, experience curves are a reflection of all factors that play into the change 
in technological performance and cost, including research and development, spillovers and 
economies of scale.” In an analysis focusing on innovation processes of five renewable energy 
case studies, Hekkert and Negro [2009] found that actions that turn knowledge into business 
opportunities (entrepreneurial activities) rise when there is guidance that positively affect 
visibility and clarity of specific wants among technology users (e.g., a policy goal aim for a 
certain percentage of renewable energy in a future year). However, they found that technologies 
did not “tip” until there was market formation, such as the creation of a small protected market 
(via a subsidy or tax advantage) or a niche market for a specific application.  
Another potential social tipping element involves migration, which is generally costly to 
the source region but can potentially be beneficial for recipient regions and for overall human 
welfare. Migration is an adaptation to new environmental conditions. Climate-related migration 
can involve forced displacement, where climate change has made it difficult to stay, or may take 
place in anticipation of future risks. Moving away from sub-Saharan Africa as desertification and 
water scarcity make survival more difficult is an example of climate displacement [Bogardi and 
Warner, 2009]. Migration can also be a response to social and economic destabilization that 
results from climate change impacts [Warner et al., 2010]. These are examples of migration as a 
mass general social response, but, as we discuss below, there can also be positive feedbacks in 
migration systems. 
Migration-systems approaches identify “push” factors that encourage or enable people to 
leave their home location and “pull” factors that encourage them towards a new location 
[Mabogunje, 1970; Fawcett, 1989; Jennissen, 2007]. Social networks are an important pull 
factor; once a migration stream has been initiated, it tends to grow, as the networks provide a 
positive feedback [Boyd, 1989; Fawcett, 1989; Massey and Zenteno, 1999]. Massey and Zenteno 
[1999] built a dynamic model of mass migration that account for feedbacks, providing the basis 
of an approach that could be used to model climate-related migration tipping points. As people 
migrate away in large numbers due to environmental change, a feedback can occur that changes 
a community’s ability to adapt [McLeman and Smit, 2006]. 
Civil conflict, and in particular the ‘conflict/development trap’, can give rise to a more 
unambiguously costly tipping point. The conflict/development trap is a well-established positive 
feedback cycle, in which failure to develop increases the likelihood of civil conflict, which in 
turns decreases the ability to develop and increases the future risks of conflict [Collier, 2003]. 
This can give rise to a counter-development tipping point, as has arguably been seen in a number 
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of strife-torn, low-income countries. Econometric results suggest that warmer temperatures can 
slow economic growth [Burke et al., 2015] and increase the likelihood of civil conflict [Hsiang 
and Burke, 2013; Hsiang et al., 2013]. Thus, climate change has the potential to make a 
conflict/development tipping point more likely, exacerbating the risk that nations may get 
trapped in a cycle of poverty and conflict that is difficult to break. 
Bentley et al. [2014] investigated whether early warning signs, such as a critical slowing 
down or an increase in variability, are associated with social tipping points. They found that, 
historically, many social systems have undergone tipping points without exhibiting such warning 
signs. For example, they point to the case of small English banks, which increased in number at 
about 2.7%/year for 150 years and then suddenly declined in 1810 with no data indicating such a 
change was impending. While social scientists can identify potential social tipping elements and 
associated mechanisms, it is far more difficult to predict when they will occur, and studies must 
consider that a range of biophysical, social, cultural, political and economic factors influence 
social responses to climate changes [Nuttall, 2012].  
Climatic tipping points may be one trigger for social tipping points. Another potential 
trigger are increases in the frequency of extreme events. Although the ‘adaptation tipping points’ 
of Kwadijk [2010] are not true tipping points, these dramatic increases in extreme event 
frequency may force true adaptation tipping points – state shifts in genuine social tipping 
elements, such as adaptive policies or behaviors, that lead to greater adaptation  [Pelling and 
Dill, 2010]. For example, there may be a critical threshold in the frequency of days over 30°C 
that triggers a technology-adoption tipping point for air-conditioners. Conversely, increased 
frequency of extreme events might also lead to costly tipping points; for example, crossing a 
threshold in the frequency of crop failures might trigger a migration or conflict tipping point. 
Sufficiently large or frequent extreme events might also trigger an environmental policy tipping 
point that accelerates greenhouse gas mitigation, or that leads to the deployment of large-scale 
climate engineering technologies such as SRM [Keith, 2013; Irvine et al., 2014].  
Extreme events have the potential to serve as ‘focusing events’: sudden crises that result 
in calls for a remedy to reduce impacts of that crisis or chances of a future crisis. Natural 
disasters have long been seen as focusing events. Focusing events provide an opportunity for 
“interest groups, government leaders, policy entrepreneurs, the news media, or members of the 
public to identify new problems, or to pay greater attention to existing but dormant problems, 
potentially leading to a search for solutions in the wake of apparent policy failure” [Birkland, 
1998]. As recognized by Bentley [2014], the acceleration of a trend towards a social tipping point 
often entails network feedbacks that amplify a message or behavior to many people [Gladwell, 
2000]. The strength of the network matters: Birkland [1996] found that the expert community of 
scientists and government agencies around earthquakes is active and connected enough to keep 
earthquake safety on the national agenda between focusing events, whereas hurricanes have a 
sparse national expert network that results in hurricanes falling off the national agenda between 
events. In thinking more broadly about shifting U.S. public opinion and action on climate 
change, Nisbet and Kotcher [2009] suggested that a network of different types of opinion leaders 
that could be prepared before a climate-related focusing event and mobilized after might be 
effective in pushing public opinion towards a tipping point on climate action. However, to date, 
the negative feedback provided by groups leveraging public opinion leaders and networks to 
maintain policy stasis has generally been more effective [Jasny et al., 2015; Farrell, 2016]. 
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The study of climatically influenced social tipping elements is still in an early phase, but 
may play an important role in the integrated assessment of the cost of climate change. 
Environmental policy and technological tipping points that affect mitigation or climate 
engineering can influence the climatic trajectory that causes damage, while those that affect 
adaptation can influence the system resilience that modulates the translation of physical impacts 
into human costs. Migration and conflict tipping points, as we discuss below, may be important 
drivers of economic shocks. We suggest that it is important for the research community to more 
broadly survey the landscape of potential climate-related social tipping elements, to investigate 
networks and other social mechanisms driving relevant positive feedbacks, and to further 
develop statistical and systems-dynamic models characterizing these mechanisms. Statistical and 
dynamical models of social tipping elements have the potential to bring greater realism to the 
socio-economic projections of IAMs and to help move the representation of decision processes 
within IAMs away from the dictatorship of the infinitely lived representative agent.  
5 Economic shocks with potential climate linkages 
Tipping point research entered the IAM realm through an explicit though rather tenuous 
link to economic catastrophes in the DICE-99 model of Nordhaus and Boyer [Nordhaus and 
Boyer, 2000]. The previous two sections discussed climatic tipping elements and climatically 
sensitive social tipping elements, and suggested ways they might be incorporated into risk 
assessment. A complementary approach might be to start with the end-point of a large economic 
shock and work backwards, asking: What sort of phenomena do we know to cause large 
economic shocks? Through what pathways might climate change affect the probability of these 
phenomena? Some of these pathways involve tipping elements; not all do. We begin with the 
observation that the specific pathway, in how climate damages affect the economy, matters. We 
then cover several potential climate-economy shocks. For some, including capital-destroying 
meteorological disasters, civil wars, and temperature-linked hits to economic growth, climatic 
links are well-established. For some others, like financial crises, international wars on a nation’s 
own soil, and large-scale political and economic restructuring, links cannot be excluded but are 
much less direct. 
Economic damages can be effected through several different channels, including 
damages to output (as typically represented in IAMs), to capital stock or savings [Fankhauser 
and Tol, 2005], to labor productivity [Graff Zivin and Neidell, 2014; Houser et al., 2015], to 
ecosystem services and other natural capital [Sterner and Persson, 2008], and to total factor 
productivity [Moyer et al., 2013]. Some damages affect primarily the level of these factors, 
which is the standard assumption in most IAMs; others affect growth rates and could lead to 
vastly larger long-run damages [Dell et al., 2012; Heal and Park, 2013; Burke et al., 2015; 
Moore and Diaz, 2015]. Like gradual economic damages, economic shocks could be effected 
through any of these channels. For a full accounting of the economic impacts of climate 
damages, it is crucial to specify the particular channel. Although Nordhaus [1994] defined an 
economic catastrophe with respect to global economic output, world GDP has risen nearly 
continuously since at least 1950, and world GDP per capita has experienced only a few 
individual years of stagnation (1975, 1982, 1991, and 2009) [The Maddison Project, 2013; Bolt 
and Zanden, 2014]. To collect data on economic shocks, we must therefore narrow our scope to 
a national level (Table 2). 
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The large economic shocks with the most direct climate ties are associated with capital-
destroying meteorological disasters. Hsiang and Jina [2014] showed that tropical cyclones 
cause a long-lasting (> 20 year) reduction in GDP. Among the countries ever hit by tropical 
cyclones, a “1-in-100 country-year” causes a persistent ~15% output reduction. Although Hsiang 
and Jina [2014] measured cyclones solely by their wind speed, a significant fraction of the 
damage caused by cyclones is flood-related, so it is reasonable to expect that sea-level rise will 
lead to more cyclone damage. Moreover, some studies indicate a regional or global increase in 
the number and intensity of tropical cyclones with climate change, which would make large 
shocks more frequent [Emanuel, 2013; Knutson et al., 2013].  
Though less directly influenced by climate than cyclones, civil wars both cause large 
economic shocks and also have an environmental connection [Hsiang et al., 2011, 2013]. Cerra 
and Saxena [2008]’s analysis of 190 countries for the period 1960 to 2001 found that civil wars 
caused a ~6 ± 1% output loss after one year, with ~3 ± 3% persisting for at least a decade. Civil 
wars that coincided with a strengthening of executive power led to more severe economic crises: 
an output reduction of ~15 ± 6% that persisted for over ten years after the crisis started. 
Moreover, as previously mentioned, econometric results indicate that certain climatic conditions 
make civic conflict more likely. A meta-analysis of 31 studies indicated that a 1-standard 
deviation increase toward higher temperatures or more extreme rainfall leads to a ~14% increase 
in the frequency of civil conflict [Hsiang and Burke, 2013; Hsiang et al., 2013]. Though this 
conclusion is not universally accepted, and though much work needs to be done to understand 
the mechanisms of the climate-conflict link [e.g., Hsiang and Meng, 2014; Buhaug, 2015], civil 
conflicts are a key area for future work assessing potential climate-economic shocks. 
Warmer temperatures themselves also have the potential to create a slowly burning 
climate-economic shock through temperature-induced effects on economic growth rates. 
Empirical work shows that, in mid- and low-latitude countries (with an average annual 
temperature above ~13°C), higher annual average temperatures reduce economic growth rates 
[Dell et al., 2009, 2012; Burke et al., 2015]. Under high-end emissions projections (RCP 8.5) and 
a slow baseline growth scenario, Burke et al. [2015]’s mean estimated growth effect could make 
GDP per capita in nearly half of countries lower in 2100 than in 2010 – a genuine economic 
catastrophe for those countries, though not one tied to a specific triggering event. One possible 
pathway for this reduction in economic growth is the effect of extreme heat days on labor 
productivity [Heal and Park, 2013; Graff Zivin and Neidell, 2014]. Another contributing 
pathway is the well-established, nonlinear link between extreme heat and agricultural 
productivity [Schlenker and Roberts, 2008, 2009; Roberts and Schlenker, 2011; Feng et al., 
2012; Tack et al., 2015]. 
Other historical triggers of large economic shocks have less clear potential for 
environmental triggers. Cerra and Saxena [2008] found that, after those associated with the 
combination of civil war and stronger executive power, the next largest economic shocks came 
from twin currency/banking crises (~10 ± 4% reduction in GDP ten years after the crisis 
starts). Currency crises occur when countries lack sufficient reserves to service debt or pay for 
critical imports, and are often resolved either through major devaluations, foreign-exchange 
market interventions, or austerity; banking crises are characterized by government-led closures, 
mergers, or takeovers of financial institutions, often in response to bank runs; and the most 
severe losses happen when the two occur together, as in the 1997 Asian financial crisis or in 
many regions in 2008 [Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999]. 
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Inspection of historical data shows that international war on a nation’s own soil – 
thankfully, perhaps too rare for robust statistical analysis – carries a stark penalty as well. GDP 
per capita in France declined 50% from 1939 to 1944, and did not return to its 1939 level until 
1948, while GDP per capita in Germany declined 60% from 1944 to 1946, recovering in 1955. 
GDP per capita in Iraq peaked in 1979 and fell to 38% of its peak value by 1989, after the end of 
the Iran-Iraq War; subsequent years of invasion and civil war has led it to a GDP per capita that 
in 2010 was 26% of its peak. Large-scale political and economic restructuring also has the 
potential to suppress GDP per capita: in the nascent USSR, GDP per capita declined 50% 
between 1917 and 1922, taking until 1926 to recover; in the ruins of the USSR, it declined 45% 
from 1989 to 1996, taking until 2006 to recover [The Maddison Project, 2013; Bolt and Zanden, 
2014]. 
Although it may not be feasible to quantitatively assess the ways in which climate change 
could enhance the likelihood of financial crises, international wars, or political and economic 
revolutions, hypothetical ‘worst-case’ scenarios might highlight areas in need of quantitative 
investigation. Might simultaneous environmental shocks in different parts of the world, made 
more likely as a result of either a changing distribution of extremes with gradual climate change 
or as a result of a change in a tipping element, threaten the global financial system? Could such 
simultaneous shocks fuel war and conflict? Could climate change induce migration flows large 
enough to trigger institutional collapse in a major world power or make international war more 
likely? If qualitative analysis suggest these scenarios are plausible, then it would highlight the 
need for quantitative work on the correlation of extreme events and on migration. 
In addition, worst-case scenarios involving both quantifiable and unquantifiable 
catastrophes might usefully supplement quantitative analysis for risk management purposes. 
While Martin and Pindyck [2015] discussed the importance of taking seriously tradeoffs among 
multiple ‘catastrophes,’ the potential for large economic shocks might necessitate entirely 
different decision criteria in addition to standard benefit-cost frameworks [Garner et al., in press; 
Hall et al., 2012; McInerney et al., 2012; Heal and Millner, 2014; Singh et al., 2015; Wagner 
and Weitzman, 2015]. Staying in the standard benefit-cost framework draws attention to the all-
important element of discounting. If realizing a committed change takes many centuries or 
longer, discounting far-out damages becomes perhaps the most important aspect of evaluating 
the seriousness of any one particular tipping point [Gollier, 2012; Arrow et al., 2013, 2014; 
Giglio et al., 2015]. 
6 Conclusion: Pathways toward integrated assessment 
Climatic tipping elements, climatically sensitive social tipping elements, and climate-
economic shocks may all be important contributors to the costs of climate change; indeed, it is 
possible that they may be the largest contributors. Their incorporation into climate change risk 
analyses is therefore a crucial task that requires pursuing multiple research pathways. 
One set of pathways starts with candidate climatic tipping elements and evaluates the 
climate-economic shocks that they might cause. While a number of studies have attempted to 
assess shocks associated with stylized tipping elements, more realistic approaches are possible. 
In particular, the growing body of empirical, econometric analyses of the effects of climate 
variability [e.g., Dell et al., 2014], as well as an emerging set of sectoral models of impact 
processes [e.g., Warszawski et al., 2014], have started to influence the assessment of more 
gradual climate change impacts. As discussed in section 3.4, experiments with empirical and 
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process-based impact models, applied to scenarios in which the critical thresholds of different 
natural-system tipping elements are crossed, can help assess the economic hazards posed by state 
shifts and prioritize economic research on tipping elements that are quantitatively important. As 
noted therein, it is also important not just to consider tipping elements independently, but also to 
examine how tipping-element state shifts may influence both one another and also climate-
economic shocks triggered by other causes. These experiments may show that some tipping 
elements have impacts that are small relative to more gradual climatic changes, and thus not a 
priority for integrated assessment research. They can also reveal how the economic influence of 
different tipping elements differs between regions and on different timescales.  
Another set of pathways, discussed in section 4, expands the nascent body of work on the 
effects of climate change upon social tipping elements. Empirical evidence regarding policy 
thresholds, technology adoption, and technology costs can inform estimates of the costs of, 
efficacy of, and barriers to adaptation and mitigation, as well as of barriers to climate 
engineering. These estimates will improve assessments of the probability of different future 
scenarios of both climate change and social resilience to climate impacts. Empirical data on the 
relationships among climate change, migration and civil conflict may reveal costs that are larger 
than those associated many climatic tipping elements. A more comprehensive survey of potential 
climatically sensitive social tipping elements, with a focus on the role of positive feedbacks and 
the development of statistical and system-dynamic models, will help yield projections of human 
responses to climate change that are more realistic than those produced by models based upon a 
small number of idealized, rational actors.  
A third set of pathways, discussed in section 5 and not entirely independent of the study 
of social tipping elements, starts with the concern that climate change may cause large-scale 
economic shocks and works backwards to identify mechanisms by which climate change may 
influence known shock triggers. Triggers with relatively clear mechanisms include 
meteorological disasters, civil conflict, and temperature effects on growth rates, but less obvious 
triggers like financial crisis and international wars should not be neglected. Both statistical and 
system-dynamic approaches may play important roles in tracing these mechanisms. 
Fourth, in many cases, empirical and modeling studies may be able to identify potential 
state shifts or climate-economic shocks without being able to assess their likelihood, timing, or 
magnitude. Under such circumstances, structured expert elicitation, in which the probability 
estimates of experts are combined based upon calibrated assessments of the experts’ reliability 
[Kriegler et al., 2009; Bamber and Aspinall, 2013; Oppenheimer et al., 2016], can temporarily 
fill in these gaps. But because conventional benefit-cost analysis performs poorly when expert 
disagreement on probability is too large, alternative approaches for robust decision making may 
be better suited to the context of tipping elements and climate-economic shocks [Heal and 
Millner, 2014]. One priority for policy research should be therefore focus on whether and how 
robust decision-making frameworks should displace benefit-cost analysis within existing, real-
world decision-making processes. Advancing understanding of tipping elements and climate-
economic shocks will require greater coordination among disciplines. By their nature, many 
critical thresholds involve pushing natural and/or social systems beyond the limits of behaviors 
to which we are accustomed, and thus require deep process insight informed by a diversity of 
empirical observations over a wide range of time scales. But understanding tipping points may 
be key to accurately assessing the societal and economic challenges posed by climate change, 
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because they may be – as Nordhaus and Boyer [2000] suggest – one of the primary sources of 
climate change risk. 
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 Table 1. Illustrative candidate tipping elements 
Candidate Climatic Tipping Element Main impact pathways Potentially 
Gladwellian 
Key Reference 
Atmosphere/ocean circulation    
Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation regional temperature, precipitation; global mean 
temperature; regional sea level 
yes [Rahmstorf, 2005] 
Atmospheric superrotation climate sensitivity (cloudiness) yes [Caballero and Huber, 2013] 
El Niño-Southern Oscillation regional temperature, precipitation yes [Latif et al., 2015] 
Regional North Atlantic convection regional temperature, precipitation yes [Drijfhout et al., 2015] 
West African Monsoon regional temperature, precipitation yes [Dong and Sutton, 2015] 
Cryosphere    
Antarctic ice sheet sea level; albedo no [Schoof, 2007] 
Arctic sea ice regional temperature, precipitation; albedo yes [Li et al., 2013] 
Greenland ice sheet sea level; albedo no [Robinson et al., 2012] 
Carbon cycle    
Methane hydrates greenhouse gas emissions no [Archer et al., 2009] 
Permafrost carbon greenhouse gas emissions no [Schuur et al., 2015] 
Ecosystem    
Amazon rainforest ecosystem services; greenhouse gas emissions no [Jones et al., 2009] 
Boreal forest ecosystem services; greenhouse gas emissions; albedo no [Jones et al., 2009] 
Coral reefs ecosystem services yes [Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2007] 
Socio-economic    
Conflict/development economic welfare yes [Hsiang et al., 2013] 
Environmental policy adaptation/vulnerability; greenhouse gas emissions yes [Baumgartner et al., 2014] 
Migration economic welfare yes [Massey and Zenteno, 1999]  
Technology  adaptation/vulnerability; greenhouse gas emissions yes [Rogers, 2003] 
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Table 2. Illustrative large economic shocks 
Economic catastrophe Illustrative effect Example Reference 
Environmental disaster ~15% output reduction for >20 years due to 1-in-100 country-year cyclone [Hsiang and Jina, 2014] 
Civil war ~15% output reduction for >10 years if combined with strengthened executive 
power 
[Cerra and Saxena, 2008] 
Temperature-induced growth rate effects Potential stalling of growth in warm countries with low productivity growth [Burke et al., 2015] 
Twin currency/banking crises ~10% output reduction for >10 years [Cerra and Saxena, 2008] 
International war on country's own soil Transient per-capita output drop of > 50% in Europe during World War II [The Maddison Project, 2013] 
Large-scale political and economic 
restructuring 
45% drop in GDP/capita in Russia from 1989 to 1996 [The Maddison Project, 2013] 
 




Figure 1. (a) Annual relative frequency (1900-2008) of the n-grams ‘tipping point’ (or ‘tipping points’) and 
‘economic shock’ (or ‘shocks’) in the Google Books English language corpus, version 2 [Michel et al., 2011]. The 
vertical dashed and solid black lines mark the publication of Gladwell [1996] and Gladwell [2000]. (b) Number of 
publications through the end of 2015 with the phrases ‘tipping point’ and ‘climate change’ in Web of Science 
(accessed 24 April 2016). 
  





































Figure 2. Illustration of the response of different types of tipping elements and non-tipping elements with thresholds 
to forcing. (a) Forcing applied over time in illustrative examples. In all plots, the red portion corresponds to the 
rising forcing and the blue portion to the falling forcing. In (b-h), the dotted vertical lines mark the time or forcing of 
the maximum rate of committed change; for tipping elements, this maximum rate defines the the critical threshold or 
‘tipping point.’ (b) Response to forcing of a system with a threshold but no positive feedbacks. The same 
relationship between forcing and direct response occurs in all systems shown. A system that exhibits the response 
shown in (b) is not a tipping element. (c-d) Response without feedback, as in (b), with the addition of a lag, plotted 
as a function of (c) time and (d) forcing. This system is also not a tipping element. (e-f) Response of a Gladwellian 
tipping element, plotted as a function of (e) time and (f) forcing. (g-h) Response of a non-Gladwellian tipping 
element, plotted as a function of (g) time and (h) forcing. In (c-d) and (g-h), solid lines represent realized change, 
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